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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, deﬁned as a situation where one
party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit
herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between
formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of
authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are
vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent
to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the
future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can
drastically inﬂuence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about
the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication
and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not
contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the
way in which the agent exercises control. (JEL: C70, C72, D23, L2)
1. Introduction
Much progress has been accomplished in the last ﬁfteen years in modelling
control allocation and in using this notion to analyze vertical and lateral
integration,
1 ﬁnancing decisions,
2 and the allocation of authority within ﬁrms.
3
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1. See for example Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and more generally Hart
(1995).
2. See for example Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994), and Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994).
3. See for example Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dessein (2000, 2002), Hart and Moore (1999b),
and Hart and Holmstro ¨m (2002).
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© 2004 by the European Economic AssociationIn all these models, although actions may not be contractible (either ex ante, or
both ex ante and ex post), the allocation of control is. However, this assumption
is not always warranted. For example:
• The president of France cannot contractually commit not to change (that is,
withdraw control from) his/her prime minister: Even if reputation consider-
ations make it credible that he/she will not ﬁre the new prime minister right
after having appointed him/her, this obviously changes subsequently de-
pending on the prime minister’s performance on the job.
• More generally, the promotion/demotion of a subordinate in an organization
(that is, the withdrawing/granting of control for a given set of tasks) rarely
involves prior contractual commitment, but instead relies on (often soft)
information about job performance.
• As for the provision of new credit lines by banks or credit card companies,
there is typically no contractual commitment for these lines to be maintained,
as banks want to protect themselves against possible abuses by customers; at
the same time, credit lines will not be withdrawn right after having been
granted, and control over the future course of action lies with the customer
until the credit line is removed.
All these examples have the following two features in common: (i) control
is clearly not fully contractible ex ante, but can be transferred somewhat
irreversibly, at least in the short run when the party doing so ﬁnds it in his or her
interest; (ii) putting a party “in control” allows the other party to test and learn
more about the agent’s ability or loyalty to the organization. In this paper, we
therefore explore the implications of transferable control, deﬁned as a situation
where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the
agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this
notion of transferable control builds on the distinction between formal and real
authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole (1997), in which the actual exercise
of authority may require certain critical information, absent which formal
control rights are vacuous
4; and while formal control rights could be contracted
upon, information transfers may not (if for instance the informed party claims
that she has no useful information, or provides useless information, when she
does not consider the information transfer to be in her interest).
In this paper, we use this notion to study the extent to which control
transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his willingness to
cooperate with the principal. We show that the distinction between contractible
4. Alternatively, undertaking an action may require the acquisition of unveriﬁable skills and
knowledge. The party initially in charge may decide to transfer the required skills (or provide the
adequate training) without being in a position to contractually commit to do so.
116 Journal of the European Economic Associationand transferable control can drastically inﬂuence how learning takes place: with
contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through
revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent
control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible,
it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the
way in which the agent exercises this control.
To position the notion of transferable control within the contract theory
literature, it is convenient to refer to the degree of contractibility of actions.
More speciﬁcally, consider the following polar cases:
(i) At one extreme, a world with fully contractible actions: contracts can then
fully determine the entire interaction between the parties; this case encom-
passes the implementation literature a ` la Maskin (1999) or Moore and
Repullo (1988), where one can contract on entire game forms. In such a
world, who “chooses” the action is irrelevant: the contracting parties can
limit themselves to sending (possibly sequential) messages to a “planner,”
who then takes or dictates all relevant actions.
5
(ii) At the other extreme, a world with only noncontractible, preassigned
actions: here, contracts hardly affect the structure of the game played by the
parties; this case encompasses both game-theoretic models (such as Kreps
et al. (1982), Sobel (1985), and Watson (1999)), which assume away any
contracting, and moral hazard models (a ` la Mirrlees 1999, Holmstro ¨m 1979,
1982, Legros and Matthews 1993), where noncontractible actions are pre-
assigned to one or the other party and can only be inﬂuenced indirectly, by
contracting over related variables (e.g., output).
In between, there is partial contracting (see Aghion et al. 2002), where
formal contracts do not determine the entire relation between the contracting
parties but can inﬂuence the underlying game between them.
6 These are situa-
tions in which some actions are ex post nonveriﬁable and therefore not con-
tractible ex ante, so that they cannot be delegated to (or dictated by) a social
planner. Yet, control over such actions can inﬂuence the dynamic interaction
between the parties. Much of the existing literature on control rights and authority
has concentrated on situations where such control is fully contractible.
7
5. The implementation results of this literature have been generalized by Maskin and Tirole
(1999) to the case where actions are noncontractible ex ante, before the revelation of the state of
nature, but become contractible ex post, after the revelation of the state of nature.
6. Aghion et al. (2002) discuss the connection between partial contracting and the debate on the
foundations of incomplete contracts (e.g., in Segal 1999, Hart and Moore 1999a, Maskin and
Moore 1999, Maskin and Tirole 1999, and Tirole 1999).
7. See e.g. Aghion and Bolton 1992, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Aghion and Tirole 1997,
Legros and Newman 1999, and Hart and Moore 1999b. See also Dewatripont 2001.
117 Aghion et al. Transferable ControlOur paper is ﬁrst related to the prior literature on control rights and
authority, to which we add the possibility of credible control transfers. We thus
focus on a case intermediate between contractible control and preassigned
actions (or “moral hazard”), where control over particular actions is not con-
tractible but still credibly transferable. Second, our model relates to the game-
theoretic literature on reputation; allowing for contracting before the actual
game takes place, however, allows us to study under which conditions—e.g.,
contractible versus transferable control—information is transmitted by action
choices rather than through revelation mechanisms. Third, since we focus on
control allocation as a way to induce cooperation, our analysis also relates to the
literature on formal versus informal contracting, and in particular to Baker et al.
(2002) and Halonen (1997). In a repeated model of ownership allocation a `l a
Grossman and Hart (1986), where all parties have complete information, Baker
et al. (2002) show that vertical integration may help the parties to hold on to
their promises of taking costly actions or making costly monetary transfers.
Based also on a repeated ownership allocation model, but with imperfect
information about the parties’ disutility from cheating on effort or investment
commitments, Halonen (1997) argues that joint ownership may emerge as a
desirable contractual outcome ex ante, because both parties will then ﬁnd it
particularly costly for their reputation to renege on their promises. This rationale
for control allocation is reminiscent of the argument of Boot et al. (1993), who
stress that “loan commitment contracts” that allow banks to unilaterally renege
on their commitments imply that the bank’s reputation for “fairness” is en-
hanced when they do not actually renege. These papers, however, do not
distinguish between contractible control and transferable control, and they
restrict attention to simple contracts, even though revelation mechanisms would
be more effective (for example, in Halonen’s framework, where trade is sup-
posed to be ex post veriﬁable, relatively simple contracts could be quite
powerful).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework.
Section 3 focuses on contractible control and shows that in a broad range of
situations the optimal contract is a revelation mechanism promising control
to the agent when he announces a noncooperative type. This kind of
mechanism ceases to be credible when control is not contractible but only
transferable. In this case, as shown in Section 4, the power of revelation
mechanism is greatly reduced and unconditional control transfers emerge as
an optimal learning device. While Sections 3 and 4 went for simplicity in not
allowing for monetary responsiveness, Section 5 shows that our results are
robust to its introduction. Finally, Section 6 connects our analysis to the
Aghion and Tirole (1997) concepts of formal and real authority, brieﬂy
discusses its implications for the study of delegation, and suggests some
obvious extensions for future research.
118 Journal of the European Economic Association2. Framework
This section outlines an incomplete information framework where control
allocation serves as a natural instrument to enhance trust and cooperation.
Speciﬁcally, we consider a relationship between a principal (she) and an agent
(he), hereafter P and A, meant to carry out a project: P has overall control over
the project but needs A for implementing it. More precisely, the project involves
two stages, design and implementation. In the design stage, the party in charge
chooses between two actions, C and N; action C is the “cooperative” action that
is best for the project, whereas action N is a “noncooperative” action that A may
favor—for example, it may enhance A’s human capital or, more generally, A’s
market value. In the implementation stage, P decides whether to implement the
project (I), or to stop it (S). A can be “good” or “bad,” and the project is worth
implementing only if A is good. Initially, P does not know A’s type; we denote
by  her prior probability that A is bad.
Speciﬁcally:
• In Stage 1, the design decision has to be made; P can either take the decision or
let A take it; we shall distinguish between the case where P and A can contract
over who is in charge of design and the case where P can simply transfer control
to A, without contractually committing herself to do so. The design decision
itself (C or N) is observed by both parties but not contractible. We normalize to
zero the parties’ payoffs from C; adopting instead the noncooperative action N
does not affect a good A but entails a loss (l) for P and a beneﬁt B for a bad
A. P’s and A’s payoffs from N are thus respectively:
8
l,0  when A is good,
l, B when A is bad.
• In Stage 2, P freely decides whether to implement or stop the project (actions
I and S respectively): this decision is not contractible and cannot be dele-
gated to A. Stopping the project yields zero payoffs for both parties. Imple-
menting the project brings instead an additional gain G to P and g to A when
A is good, while it brings a loss (L)t oP and a gain b to A if A is bad. P’s
and A’s payoffs from I are thus respectively:
G, g when A is good,
L, b when A is bad.
We assume away discounting between the two stages; P’s and A’s overall
payoffs are thus simply the sum of the ﬁrst- and second-stage payoffs and can
be summarized as follows:
8. At the end of Section 3 and in Section 5, we discuss the robustness of our results with respect
to changes in the payoff matrix.
119 Aghion et al. Transferable Control• When A has a good type:
• when A has a bad type:
We shall restrict attention to the case where:
B  b  0,
L  l  0.
Thus a good A is willing to cooperate in Stage 1 and gains g from P’s
implementing the project; in contrast, a bad A gains B from the noncooperative
design action N; he also gains b from the implementation of the project, but
prefers the noncooperative design action N even if this induces P to stop the
project (B  b). P incurs a loss l from the noncooperative action at the design
stage and an even bigger loss L from implementing the project when the agent
has a bad type; P is thus willing to let a bad A choose the noncooperative action
at the design stage to learn his type (and stop the project).
This payoff structure is that of a typical signalling game, where preference
heterogeneity between the two types of A can allow for separation. It is however
particular in one important respect: there is congruence in both periods between
the preferences of P and the good type of A (in particular, both prefer C followed
by implementation to N followed by stopping the project).
9 At the end of
Section 3, we discuss the role of this congruence.
If P is uninformed about A’s type when deciding whether to implement or
stop the project in Stage 2, she will stop the project (whatever action has been
chosen in Stage 1 since utilities are all separable over time) whenever:
1  G  L  0;
9. Fixing the implementation decision, a good A is here indifferent between cooperating or not
on design. The analysis applies unchanged when a good A gains  from adopting N, where  is
small but either negative (a good A strictly prefers to cooperate) or positive (a good A is slightly
reluctant to cooperate). What matters is that a good type is willing to cooperate if this induces P
to implement the project (i.e., g  ).
Action IS
CG , g 0, 0
NG  l, g l,0
Action IS
C L, b 0, 0
N L  l, B  b l, B
120 Journal of the European Economic Association(the left-hand side is the expected Stage-2 payoff of the principal if she
implements the project, the right-hand side is her Stage-2 payoff if she stops the
project); this can be reexpressed as:
  * 
G
G  L
.
Incomplete information thus generates two types of problems: ﬁrst, when 
is too large, P prefers to stop the project since she cannot obtain a positive
payoff in Stage 2. Second, when  is small enough, P cooperates (does not stop
the project) but loses L when A is a bad type. We now explore alternative means
by which these two problems can be solved.
We start our analysis by assuming that payoffs are private beneﬁts and that the
parties are not responsive to monetary incentives. Therefore, contracts consist of
revelation mechanisms to be played at the beginning of each stage; as a function of
messages sent at the beginning of Stage 1, control over project design is allocated
to the agent or kept by the principal, and given the messages exchanged between the
two parties up to Stage 2, the principal decides whether to implement the project.
When parties are instead responsive to monetary incentives (in Section 5), optimal
contracts also include message-contingent transfer payments.
3. Contractible Control: The Power of Revelation Mechanisms
In this section we assume that control over Stage 1 can be speciﬁed by an
enforceable contract between P and A. The set of feasible strategies and
contracts and the timing of moves can then be described as follows (in the
absence of monetary responsiveness).
In the contracting phase, P offers a contract to A; this contract dictates an
allocation of control over the Stage 1 action, possibly contingent upon messages
sent by A at that stage. The agent then decides whether or not to accept this
contract; if he refuses, the game ends and both parties get zero; if he accepts, the
game proceeds as follows:
• In Stage 1, A sends messages and control is then (possibly randomly)
allocated to P or A according to the contract; whoever ends up in charge of
Stage 1 chooses between C and N.
• In Stage 2, A may again send messages; P then decides whether or not to
implement the project.
Note however that, without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to
contracts in which the agent sends no message in Stage 2. This follows from the
cheap-talk nature of the Stage 2 message game: a bad A only sees advantages
and no cost in mimicking a good type at Stage 2, since doing so can only
121 Aghion et al. Transferable Controlencourage P to implement the project, which is good for him. And since P’s
decision to implement the project or not is not contractible, she will do it if and
only if it is in her interest to do so.
For simplicity, we concentrate next on contracts where pure strategies are
played (and we explain in footnotes how the results are robust to the possibility
of mixed strategies). Two types of contracts are therefore possible:
• Contracts where the agent does not send any message (equivalently, both types
send the same message, which is then useless). P can for example simply choose
to keep control over the Stage 1 action, and implement the project in Stage 2 if
and only if   *. P’s payoff is then max{(1  )G  L, 0}. Alternatively,
P could give control to A and infer A’s type from his choice of action; we further
explore this latter possibility in the following section.
• Revelation mechanisms, where P learns A’s type through the messages sent
in Stage 1 and then implements the project only if A reports a good type.
Intuitively, in such a revelation mechanism a bad A could gain b in Stage
2 by misreporting a good type. To prevent this, P must reward a bad A for
revealing himself, and can do so by giving a bad A control over Stage 1. Since
a bad A can obtain B by choosing N, to induce truth-telling P must grant control
to a bad A with at least probability b/B; in addition, in order to minimize a bad
A’s incentive to misreport his type, P should not give control to a good A. The
following proposition conﬁrms this intuition:
PROPOSITION 1. P’s optimal revelation mechanism, Mc, is such that: (i) P keeps
control in Stage 1 when A announces a good type, and (ii) P allocates control
to A with probability b/B when A announces a bad type. In the associated
equilibrium, action N is chosen if and only if a bad A gets control and the
project is implemented if and only if A announces a good type.
10
Proof. In any revealing equilibrium, P implements the project if the agent
reports a good type and stops it otherwise. Thus, a good A is always willing to
report his type, since he gets g by doing so and 0 by behaving as a bad type.
Let x and y denote the probabilities that A obtains control when announcing
a good and a bad type. P will clearly choose action C when she has control over
10. This result remains valid when equilibrium mixed strategies are considered, which can be
seen as follows: (i) ﬁrst, if A obtains control in Stage 1, he will play a pure strategy for sure, and
so will P in Stage 2; (ii) if P is in control in Stage 1, she will not mix in Stage 2 (between I and
S) if her posterior probability assessment that A is bad is not equal to *. But if P does not mix
in Stage 2, she prefers the bad A also not to mix (between saying he is bad or good), since the loss
from I (L) outweighs the loss from Stage 1 control (as for the good A, he never wants to mix, since
he is indifferent between C and N, and only cares about the Stage 2 action); (iii) ﬁnally, an outcome
where P is in control in Stage 1 and mixes in Stage 2 is also unattractive for P, because it means
she obtains a zero payoff upon having Stage 1 control (and a negative one upon not having Stage
1 control).
122 Journal of the European Economic AssociationStage 1. When a good A gets control, he is indifferent between actions C and N
while P beneﬁts from action C. In contrast, a bad A always chooses action N
when in control. Therefore, the best for P is that a good A chooses C whenever
in control: this improves P’s payoff, and also helps P deterring a bad A from
misreporting a good type. P’s expected payoff is then given by
1  G  yl,
while the bad A’s incentive compatibility condition for truth-telling is:
yB  1  xb  xB.
Since B  b, the optimal probabilities of control are thus x  0 and y  b/B. 
The mechanism Mc gives P an expected payoff equal to
1  G  
b
B
l,
and is thus positive whenever
  c 
G
G 
b
B
l
.
The mechanism Mc addresses the two problems mentioned before: the
revelation of A’s type allows P to implement the project when—and only
when—it is desirable to do so. However, this revelation has a cost: P must
“reward” a bad type A for telling the truth, namely by granting control to that
bad type in Stage 1 with probability b/B, in which case action N is
implemented instead of action C.
Note that P prefers Mc over “keeping control with probability 1 and
implementing the project”: L  l and B  b imply
1  G  
b
B
l  1  G  L.
Note moreover that c  *, so there are cases (c    *) where Mc is
proﬁtable even when, if uninformed, P would have chosen to stop the project in
Stage 2.
REMARK. We stressed above that the payoff structure was particular in having
P’s preferences congruent with that of a good A. Indeed, the above revelation
mechanism no longer works when the principal’s preferences become sufﬁ-
ciently noncongruent with those of both types of agents. Suppose for example
11
11. We thank a referee for suggesting this example.
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payoffs from C and N are the same as before, and N brings zero to P and a bad
A; but a good A now gains Bg  0 from N. Therefore, P prefers C to N and N,
and a bad A prefers N to C and N, but a good A now prefers N to C and N.
Let as before x and y denote the probabilities that A obtains control when
announcing a good and a bad type. To induce A to tell the truth, we must have
xBg  g  yBg  yg; (1)
for the good type, and
yB  xB  1  xb. (2)
for the bad type.
Indeed, if a good A report his type truthfully, in Stage 1 he obtains control
with probability x and can then choose his preferred action N, while in Stage
2 P implements the project; if he reports instead a bad type, with probability y
he gets control and reveals his true type by choosing N, inducing P to
implement the project,
12 otherwise P chooses C and then stops the project.
Similarly, if a bad A reports his type truthfully he obtains control and chooses
N with probability y, while P stops the project to avoid losses in Stage 2; if he
pretends instead to be a good type, with probability x he acquires control and
then reveals his type by choosing N, otherwise the principal keeps control and
implements the project.
The two incentive conditions can be rewritten as
1  1  y  1  x 
1
1  	
1  y,
where   g/Bg and 	  b/B. Therefore, if
1   
1
1  	
,
both conditions can be simultaneously satisﬁed only if x  y  1, which amounts
to simply transferring control to A and learning from his choice of action.
4. Transferable Control and Learning by Delegation
While Mc illustrates how control allocation can be used to induce truth-telling
through a standard revelation mechanism, this contract suffers from obvious
12. Alternatively, P could stick to the belief that A has a bad type; however, such a belief would
contradict, for example, the Cho–Kreps intuitive criterion, since only a good A gains from choosing
N, even if doing so is the only way to induce P to implement the project.
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type has been revealed. Hence our interest in exploring the case where control
is transferable but noncontractible: in that case, P can choose to transfer control
(given A’s messages) at the beginning of Stage 1, but cannot commit to do so
at the contracting stage. The set of strategies and the timing of events are then
modiﬁed as follows. In the contracting phase, P offers a contract to A, which
again allows for messages to be sent by A at the beginning of each stage, but can
no longer dictate the allocation of control over the ﬁrst stage. As before, A then
decides whether or not to accept the contract; if he refuses, the game ends and
both parties get zero; if he accepts, the game proceeds as follows.
• In Stage 1, A sends messages; then P decides with full discretion whether or
not to transfer control to A; whoever ends up in charge of Stage 1 chooses
between C and N.
• Stage 2 is unchanged: A may again send messages before P decides whether
or not to implement the project.
We can immediately establish the following lemma:
LEMMA 1. When control over Stage 1 is transferable but not contractible, there
is no loss of generality in not asking the agent to send messages.
Proof. When control over Stage 1 is not contractible, message games involve
cheap talk not only in Stage 2 but also in Stage 1: in both stages, a bad A sees
only advantages and no cost in reporting a good type. Therefore the principal
may as well ignore any message A might send at any stage. 
Given this lemma, at the contracting stage P must simply choose between
keeping control, in which case she remains uninformed about A’s type by the
end of Stage 1, or transferring Stage-1 control to A. The cost of such a control
transfer is that the bad A will choose action N, which is his dominant strategy.
The good A instead is happy to choose action C, especially since this signals his
good type and ensures that P implements the project.
13 In comparison with the
case where P keeps control in Stage 1, transferring control to A clearly improves
A’s expected payoff. It also increases P’s expected payoff whenever the (short-
term) loss from losing control in Stage 1 is more than compensated by the
(long-term) beneﬁt of learning A’s type prior to Stage 2.
The Stage-1 loss comes from the fact that a bad A chooses action N. The
expected loss for P, who then stops the project in Stage 2, is therefore equal to
l. The Stage-2 informational gain now depends upon the equilibrium that
would prevail if A did not signal his type:
13. There may also exist pooling equilibria where both types of agents choose action N. These
equilibria are however dominated by those in which P keeps control over the Stage-1 action.
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 *), an
uninformed principal P would always implement the project; learning A’s type
then allows P to stop the project and avoid the loss L when A turns out to be a
bad type. Thus, for  
 * learning A’s type allows P to save L in expected
terms; P will thus prefer to grant control to A in Stage 1 since L  l implies
L  l.
• If the probability of a bad type agent is sufﬁciently high (  *), an
uninformed principal P would instead stop the project; learning A’s type then
allows P to implement the project and gain G if A turns out to be a good type.
Thus, learning A’s type when   * generates an additional expected gain
equal to (1  )G to the principal; for such values of , P will thus prefer
to grant control to A in Stage 1 if:
1  G  l,
or equivalently:
  t 
G
G  l
.
This establishes our main result:
PROPOSITION 2. P’s optimal transferable-control contract, Mt, is such that: (i)
no messages are sent before Stage 1 (and a fortiori after that stage); (ii) P
transfers control over the Stage 1 action to A if   t and keeps control (and
stops the project in Stage 2) otherwise; (iii) if A obtains control in Stage 1, he
chooses action C if his type is good and action N otherwise, and P implements
the project if and only if action C has been chosen.
14
It is therefore in P’s interest to transfer control to A for small values of :
if  is too high, the hope that a good A will act cooperatively in Stage 1 in order
to keep the project going in Stage 2 is too small compared with the short-term
loss from a bad A’s noncooperating in the ﬁrst stage.
To summarize, when A’s willingness to cooperate is initially unknown by
P, two problems may potentially arise: either cooperation is impossible in Stage
2( P stops the project), or “excessive” cooperation imposes losses on P. Then,
“testing” A by giving him control over Stage 1 creates an opportunity for A to
reveal his willingness to cooperate, which in turn helps overcome each of the
preceding two problems. By transferring control of Stage 1 to A, P may not lose
14. Once again, mixed strategies will not alter the result: whatever the equilibrium messages sent
by A, the probability that P transfers control cannot be increasing in her probability assessment that
A is bad. On the other hand, it is also impossible that it be strictly decreasing in equilibrium,
because this would violate the bad A’s incentive constraint. Therefore, messages can be ignored
and we are left with unconditional control transfers.
126 Journal of the European Economic Associationthat much since a good A will want to choose action C to induce the imple-
mentation of the project; furthermore, any early loss induces P to take “appro-
priate measures” (that is, to stop the project) to prevent subsequent losses.
15
A ﬁnal remark to conclude this section: by transferring control to A, which
is optimal when   t, P achieves an expected payoff equal to:
1  G  l.
This payoff achieved through Mt is lower than what she gets with the contract-
ible-control revelation mechanism Mc described in the previous section, namely:
1  G 
b
B
l.
Therefore:
• When control is contractible, it is optimal for P to have A’s type revealed
through a direct revelation mechanism rather than through trust-building;
speciﬁcally, the relationship is proﬁtable when   c and Mc is then the
optimal contract for P, since it induces truth-telling with a smaller proba-
bility (b/B instead of 1) of control allocated to a bad A.
• When control is transferable but not contractible, the relationship is proﬁt-
able only when
  t 
G
G  l
,
and Mt is then the optimal contract for P; control is then transferred with
higher probability (1 instead of b/B) but only for a smaller interval of ’s
(since t  c).
5. Monetary Responsiveness
We have thus far restricted attention to the case where the contracting parties do
not respond to monetary incentives. But now suppose that P’s and A’s utilities
are given by:
UP  P  p and UA  A  p
15. On the other hand, P must be able to commit to let A exert control over a number of actions
and/or for some time, so as to allow a bad A to gain sufﬁciently from the exercise of this control.
If for example P had the right to “withdraw” control from A at any moment, then P would indeed
be tempted to overrule A’s choice of N. Anticipating this, a bad A would then “choose” C to
preserve his beneﬁt from implementation and the principal would thus never learn the agent’s
“exercise” of control. More generally, P must be in a position to transfer control irreversibly for
at least some time, for such control to be useful as a learning device.
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previous section), and p is a monetary transfer from A to P. Since we now have
transferable utilities, what matters for efﬁciency is the sum of the parties’ payoffs;
in keeping with the analysis of the previous sections, we assume in this section
L  l  B  b,
so that it is efﬁcient to stop the project when the agent is bad.
Allowing for monetary responsiveness means that contracts can require
transfers contingent on messages, which in turn can provide additional ways to
acquire the information over A’s type. In particular, if b  g, P can simply keep
control and obtain full revelation at Stage 2 by having the good A pay g against
project implementation.
16 The possibility of monetary transfers thus eliminates
the role for allocating or transferring control to A in that case. When b  g,
however, the previous insights remain valid, as we show next.
5.1. Contractible Control
Introducing monetary transfers allows P to extract rents from A and also to
“sell” Stage 1 control. The following proposition extends the previous analysis:
PROPOSITION 3. Assume that b  g. Then, the optimal separating contract for P
consists in selling control at price g with probability (b  g)/(B  g) when A
reports a bad type, while keeping control and requiring a payment of g when A
reports a good type.
17 In this mechanism, a good A obtains no rents while a bad
A obtains b  g and P obtains a positive expected payoffs as long as
  c
m 
1
1  	b  g/B  g
	l  gG  g

.
16. If b  g, in the absence of any messages, there exists a separating equilibrium in which: (i)
P keeps control and chooses C in Stage 1 and implements the project in Stage 2 only if A pays p 
g; (ii) only a good A makes the payment. In this equilibrium, P implements the project only when
A is good and both types of agent get zero rent.
17. Once again, this result is robust to the consideration of mixed strategies. Essentially the same
arguments apply as in footnote 10, since the mechanism is very similar—although with a different
probability of giving control to A—except that there is a price g to be paid by A whenever he
actually receives Stage 1 control: (i) ﬁrst, if A obtains control in Stage 1, he will play a pure strategy
for sure, and so will P in Stage 2; (ii) if P is in control in Stage 1, she will not mix in Stage 2
(between I and S) if her posterior probability assessment that A is bad is not equal to *. But if P
does not mix in Stage 2, she prefers the bad (resp. good) A also not to mix (between saying he is
bad or good), because I (resp. S) is inefﬁcient; (iii) ﬁnally, an outcome where P is in control in
Stage 1 and mixes in Stage 2 is also unattractive for P, because, on the one hand, it means she does
not beneﬁt from the gain of implementation of the project and, on the other hand, by lowering the
probability of implementation, she will moreover obtain a lower expected payment from the good
A (whose participation constraint is binding) and in turn from the bad A (whose incentive constraint
is binding) at the initial message stage.
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In other words, when b  g the introduction of monetary transfers does not
eliminate the role for (contractible) control allocation; in particular, it can be
checked that, whenever the relationship is proﬁtable (  c
m), P prefers this
separating contract to staying uninformed and keeping control over Stage 1.
However, the optimal separating contract still allocates control with positive
probability to a bad A and never to a good A; thus, while monetary transfers
allow for a reduction in the probability of control given to a bad A, the optimal
contract still suffers from the same credibility problem as in Section 3.
REMARK. As shown in Aghion et al. (2003), allowing for monetary transfers
tends to increase the power of revelation mechanisms: Charging for control
allocation reduces a good A’s net gain from acquiring control, and therefore
reduces the degree of noncongruence between a good A and P. Yet, we show
that these revelation mechanisms only work if the lack of congruence between
the good A’s preferences and P’s preferences is not too severe.
5.2. Transferable Control
When b  g, a bad type is more eager than a good one to get control over Stage
1 and/or convince P to implement a project; however, P would never transfer
control or implement the project if she learned that A was bad. It is therefore
impossible to have A’s type revealed through type-contingent messages or
payments. In fact we can show:
LEMMA 2. Assume b  g. When control over Stage 1 is transferable but not
contractible, then payments and control allocation cannot depend on the agent’s
type; there is thus no loss of generality in not asking the agent to send messages.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Given this lemma, at the contracting stage P must simply stipulate a price
(which must be the same for both types) and choose between: (i) keeping
control, in which case she remains uninformed about A’s type by the end of
Stage 1; (ii) transferring Stage-1 control to A. The same analysis as in Section
4 then leads to:
PROPOSITION 4. Assume b  g. When control over Stage 1 is transferable but
not contractible, the relationship is proﬁtable as long as   t  G/(G  l),
in which case P’s optimal contract is such that: (i) no messages are sent before
Stage 1 (and a fortiori after that stage); (ii) A pays g and P transfers control
129 Aghion et al. Transferable Controlover Stage 1 to A; (iii) in Stage 1, a good A chooses C whereas a bad A chooses
N, and in Stage2Pi m plements the project if and only if C has been chosen in
Stage 1. In comparison with the contractible control optimum, the good A still
gets no rents, the bad A gets higher rents and P gets lower rents. Finally, if  
t, it is optimal for P to keep control and stop the project.
18
Proof. See Appendix. 
Introducing monetary transfers thus allows P to extract some of the agent’s
rents (when the relationship is proﬁtable) but does not otherwise affect the
optimal contract. Transferring control remains the only way for P to learn A’s
type in Stage 1.
19
6. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper provides contract theoretic foundations for games in which a prin-
cipal needs to transfer control rights to her agent in order to “test” her ability or
propensity to cooperate in the future. Speciﬁcally, we have shown that when
control is transferable, as opposed to being contractible, simple control transfers
emerge as optimal learning devices. Thus, moving from contractible to trans-
ferable control can signiﬁcantly reduce the power of revelation mechanisms: the
principal may no longer rely on communication and message-based control
transfers, but simply put the agent in charge and learn from the agent’s exercise
of control.
Taking a contractual perspective moreover generates additional insights for
the theory of organizations. In this section, we discuss two applications of our
framework to, respectively, the transfer of “real” authority and the scope of
delegation.
6.1. Transferring Real Authority
Aghion and Tirole (1997) (hereafter AT) stress that the exercise of authority
requires more than the formal right to make decisions: it also requires relevant
information in order to take appropriate decisions. AT investigate this issue in the
18. Just as without monetary responsiveness, mixed strategies will not alter the result: whatever
the equilibrium messages sent by A, the probability that P transfers control cannot be increasing in
her probability assessment that A is bad. On the other hand, it is also impossible that it be strictly
decreasing in equilibrium, because this would violate the bad A’s incentive constraint. Moreover,
the condition b  g also rules out any separation between types, even a probabilistic one, using
monetary payments. Therefore, we are left with unconditional control transfers and monetary
payments.
19. However, when control is contractible, P does better using the revelation mechanism
described in Subsection 5.1, which minimizes the probability of giving control to a bad A.
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ex-ante indistinguishable projects. Contracting ﬁrst takes place over formal author-
ity, then effort is exerted by the parties in order to acquire information about the
payoffs of the various investment projects, and ﬁnally the investment project can be
chosen. Since the parties have partially congruent payoffs, it may be in the interest
of the party endowed with formal authority, when she is uninformed, to grant real
authority to the other party, by following his recommendation.
In order to connect AT’s basic setup to our analysis, let us reinterpret Stage
1 of our model in the light of the AT framework: label party P’s favorite project
as “action C,” while A’s favorite project is “action N.” Knowing which actions
are C and N is however not obvious, because they are among n possible actions
that are ex ante indistinguishable. A’s type in our model can be interpreted as the
degree of congruence of A’s payoff function with P’s payoff function: a “good
type” is congruent with P, while a “bad type” is not. The difference in
information structure between the AT model and our model is that AT assume
that both parties are initially uninformed about project returns but know the
degree of congruence of their payoffs. Here instead, P knows the various project
returns, but does not know the degree of congruence between A’s interest and
her own. This matters because P has to rely on A in Stage 2 if she does not stop
the project. The question then is whether P can learn about A’s payoff structure
by giving him (real) authority in Stage 1.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the formal Stage-1 decision rights necessarily
belong to A (suppose for example, as in the classical moral hazard literature, that
P is either too busy or unable to actually take the action in that stage). In this
case, the relevant notion of control is, who has the information needed to take
decision, that is, who has real authority. And to the extent that the relevant
information is not “veriﬁable,” this control is not contractible but it is transfer-
able: since A has formal authority, providing him with the relevant information
indeed amounts to an irreversible transfer of real authority.
To be speciﬁc, assume as in AT that, except for C and N, all the other
projects are so bad that choosing at random is worse than doing nothing at all.
Since A is initially uninformed about project returns, he then needs information
from P to make any Stage-1 decision. It is natural to assume that, in many
instances, P cannot commit ex ante to transmit the appropriate information.
20
On the other hand, if P informs A about the identity of both “action C” and
“action N,” control is irreversibly transferred to A: once A knows about action
N, there is nothing to prevent him from choosing it, given that he has received
formal Stage-1 control rights initially.
With this reinterpretation of the Stage-1 actions along the lines of the AT
20. In particular, if contractually instructed to identify x actions for A, P could decide to only tell
A about action C and “bad” actions (possibly identifying several times the same action), but not
action N.
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provided that the probability  that A is not congruent enough with P is not too
large, it can become optimal for P to give away (or sell, under monetary
responsiveness) formal authority over the Stage-1 action to A, and also to
transmit information to A about which among the n actions are actions C and N.
Through this transfer of control, P has the opportunity to learn about A’s type,
and to stop the project in Stage 2 if and only if A has chosen action N in Stage 1.
Let us now assume that formal Stage-1 decision rights can be contractually
allocated to either P or A. Two cases might then be considered:
• if P can provide A with the relevant information about C and N before
allocating formal Stage-1 decision rights, we are back to the case of con-
tractible control: indeed, by informing A beforehand, P can credibly grant
real authority through the (possibly message-contingent) allocation of formal
Stage-1 decision rights. As in Section 3, P may then ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁrst
provide A with the relevant information and, second, offer formal control to
A with positive probability when reporting a bad type.
• if instead the relevant information about C and N cannot be understood by
A until after he has already been allocated formal authority over Stage 1, then
the logic of transferable control applies again. Contractually allocating
formal authority to A is indeed no longer a credible way to grant him real
authority. However, once formal authority has been allocated to A, P can
also grant him real authority by providing the relevant information. The
analysis is then essentially the same as in the beginning of this section, where
A was always endowed with formal Stage-1 control.
6.2. The Scope of Delegation
In the previous subsection, we identiﬁed circumstances under which P informs
A about both actions C and N, in order to let him reveal his willingness to
cooperate. In contrast, in AT, no such dynamic consideration exists and imple-
menting one’s favorite project is the only thing that matters. As a result,
transfers of real authority never occur: when the party endowed with formal
authority turns to the other party for advice, it receives information about at
most one project, and therefore has no choice but to follow the recommendation.
In our setup, P ﬁnds it instead optimal to transfer real authority to A in Stage 1
in order to learn about his type, which is helpful for Stage 2. We therefore have
true delegation here, motivated by the concern for future cooperation.
We can build on this insight to analyze the optimal scope or size of
delegation. To this end, we extend the action set to include convex combinations
of actions C and N. Speciﬁcally, for any   [0, 1], action N generates payoffs
l for the principal, 0 for a good agent and B for a bad agent. P can now
grant partial control to A over any subset of actions N. In the AT interpretation,
132 Journal of the European Economic Associationthis amounts to giving A the relevant information about these actions. An
alternative interpretation is that Stage 1 consists of several projects, each of
which involves two actions N and C, with payoffs as described before. P then
decides which fraction of projects to delegate to A.
This convexiﬁcation of the action set allows P to replicate the contractible
control optimum with only transferable control. Namely, it is optimal for P to
transfer control over the actions N for   [0,  ], where    b/B represents
the minimal amount of delegation required for a bad A to reveal his type. The
extent of delegation thus increases with B and decreases with b: since the goal
is to induce a bad A to signal his type by choosing action N, it is easier, the
higher the short-term gain B of doing so, and the smaller the long-term loss b
of doing so.
This extension leads for example to intuitive comparative statics results:
• Suppose for example that, with exogenous probability , the principal-agent
relationship disappears after Stage 1, for example, due to the technological
obsolescence of the ﬁrm or of the agent’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. Then b must
be replaced with (1  )b and the optimal amount of delegation becomes
 ()  (1  )b/B. Thus, delegation decreases with the rate of obsolescence.
• Alternatively, one could assume that the beneﬁt B that the bad agent
obtains from action N now only arises if the agent receives an outside job
offer. This would for example be the case if action N corresponds to an
investment in the agent’s general human capital or, more generally, in his
market value, at the expense of the ﬁrm. Call this probability . Now, the
optimal amount of delegation is deﬁned by   b/(B). Thus, delegation
decreases with labor market mobility as measured by .
6.3. Further Possible Extensions
We have focused on a simple model with two periods, two types of agents, and
two actions. Yet, we have allowed for a full-blown mechanism design approach,
in which the contracting set becomes particularly rich in the case with monetary
responsiveness. The main insights should generalize to the case of multiple
types and actions, but investigating optimal learning through control allocation
in a dynamic setting is an interesting avenue for further research.
The previous discussion illustrates the potential for the notion of transfer-
able control to enrich the analysis of delegation in organizations in a dynamic
context. In particular, we have been able to rationalize transfers of real authority
as a learning device. This could be a useful building block for further investi-
gating the interaction between information ﬂows, the design of hierarchies and
trust-building in organizations.
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A.1. Proof of Proposition 3.
As in Section 3, we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms where, at each
stage, A sends one of two messages—“good” and “bad.” We proceed again by
backward induction.
We ﬁrst check that there is no scope for revelation of A’s type in Stage
2. Consider a candidate equilibrium where A reveals his type at Stage 2, in
which case P implements the project only if A is good. In order for a bad A
not to pretend to be good, announcing a good type must involve an addi-
tional transfer p in P’s favor. Whatever the Stage 1 action (C or N), a good
A would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to pay p (and have the project implemented) only if
g  p  0,
and a bad A will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to mimic a good type if
b  p  0.
But these two conditions cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed when b  g.
Moving back one step, consider the control allocation stage. A can in
principle reveal his type by “acquiring control” at some speciﬁed price. More
precisely, consider a separating equilibrium and let (xg, pg) and (xb, pb) denote
the agent’s probabilities of obtaining control and the payments in P’s favor
respectively attached to reporting a good type and a bad type. In any such
separating equilibrium, when P keeps control of Stage 1 she chooses C and then
implements the project only if A reported a good type. A bad A chooses N
whenever in control, and P then stops the project. Without loss of generality, a
good A can be assumed to choose C when in control,
21 and P then implements
the project.
The two participation constraints are thus:
g  pg  0
and:
xb B  pb  0.
If a bad A falsely reports a good type, he reveals his type when in control (by
choosing N), in which case P then stops the project, and induces P to implement
the project when P keeps control. A bad A is thus willing to report the truth if:
21. As before, requiring a good A to choose N is inefﬁcient and gives a bad A additional
incentives to falsely report a good type.
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If a good A falsely announces a bad type, P chooses C when in control and then
stops the project. When A gets control, choosing N would again lead P to stop
the project; however, at this point A may try to “signal” his good type by
choosing C instead. Indeed, following the Cho–Kreps intuitive criterion, a
choice of action C can only be attributed to a good A, and must therefore be
followed by project implementation, irrespective of previous announcements.
The good A’s incentive constraint is then
22:
g  pg  xbg  pb.
The optimal contract leading to a separating equilibrium maximizes P’s ex-
pected payoff:
1  pg  G  	pb  1  xb  0  xbl
,
subject to the above constraints. Two things can be noted at this point. First,
giving control less often to a good type (reducing xg) relaxes the bad A’s
incentive constraint (since B  b) without affecting P’s payoff, so that it is
optimal for P to set xg  0. Second, since B  b  g, the participation constraint
of the bad A is satisﬁed whenever his incentive constraint and the participation
constraint of the good A are. These two observations allow us to rewrite the
relevant constraints as:
g  pg  0,
g  pg  xbg  pb,
and:
xb B  pb  b  pg.
The last condition must be binding, otherwise P could increase pb. Using this
condition to determine pb, P’s expected payoff can be expressed as
pg  1  G  	xbl  B  b
,
while the ﬁrst two conditions become
pg 
 g,
b  g 
 xbB  g.
22. Absent the Cho–Kreps criterion, P may refuse A’s signal and stick to the reported type, which
would reduce A’s beneﬁt from falsely reporting a bad type. The analysis would be similar, although
P could then reduce the probability of control given to a bad type (from (b  g)/(B  g)t o( b 
g)/B).
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pg  g, xb 
b  g
B  g
,
and the corresponding expected transfer pb is
pb  xbB  b  pg 
b  g
B  g
g  xbg,
which can be implemented by asking for a price g whenever control is allocated
to A.
This separating equilibrium yields 0 to a good A and xb(B  g)  b  g to
a bad A, while P obtains a payoff of:
1  G  g  
b  g
B  g
l  g,
which is positive provided:
 
 c
m 
1
1 
b  g
B  g
l  g
G  g
.
This establishes the Proposition.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2.
It sufﬁces to show that A’s payments and P’s decisions cannot be message
or type-contingent. We ﬁrst show that there is no scope for revelation of A’s
type at Stage 2. If separation were to occur at that stage, a bad A would not
pay anything since an informed P would then stop the project. A good
A could try to credibly report his type by making a speciﬁc payment p,i n
order to induce P to implement the project. However, a good A would be
willing to pay only p 
 g, and a bad A would then also report a good type
since p  b.
We now show that there is no scope for messages at Stage 1 either. In
any separating equilibrium, P would keep control and stop the project when
a bad A reveals his type. A bad A would thus not pay anything. A good A
could try to reveal his type by making a speciﬁc payment p in order to
inﬂuence P’s decision over the allocation of Stage 1 control. But again a
good A would be willing to pay p only if p 
 g, in which case a bad A would
pay p to obtain control and choose action N, even if this leads P to stop the
project. The lemma is proved.
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The previous lemma establishes that P cannot learn A’s type simply through
message-contingent payments and the reasoning is then similar to that of
Section 4. If   t, P prefers learning A’s type by transferring control over
Stage 1. A good A then obtains g (by choosing C and inducing P to implement
the project) and a bad A obtains B  g (it is a dominant strategy to choose N,
even though it then leads P to stop the project). The maximal price P can ask
is thus p  min(g, B)  g; a good A then gets no rent while a bad A gets B 
g, and P’s expected payoff is
g  1  G  l  1  G  g  l  g,
which is lower than when control is contractible.
If P opted instead for keeping control with probability 1, she would remain
uninformed about A’s type and implement the project only if   *; in that
case, she could still require at most a price p  g, which is the maximal price
a good A is willing to pay. She would thus get (1  )(G  g)  (L  g),
which is lower than what she can get with the above revelation mechanism. And
if   *, P would stop the project and thus earn zero (since she could not ask
for any positive payment in that case). Therefore, P prefers the previous
mechanism to keeping control with probability 1.
If   t, P prefers keeping control and stopping the project; anticipating
this, A does not pay anything.
This completes the proof.
References
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton (1992). “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Finan-
cial Contracting.” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 473–494.
Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (2002). “On Partial Contracting.”
European Economic Review, 46(4–5), 745–753.
Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (2003). “Transferable Control,”
Working paper, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, ECARES and IDEI.
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole (1997). “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.”
Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1–29.
Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy (2002). “Relational Contracts and the
Theory of the Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 39–84.
Boot, Arnoud, Stuart Greenbaum, and Anjan Thakor (1993). “Reputation and Discretion in
Financial Contracting.” American Economic Review, 83, 206–212.
Dessein, Wouter (2000). “Control Allocations in Joint Undertakings: Balancing Formal and
Real Authority,” Working paper, University of Chicago.
Dessein, Wouter (2002). “Authority and Communication within Organizations.” Review of
Economic Studies, 69, 811–838.
Dewatripont, Mathias (2001). “Authority.” Walras-Bowley Lecture presented at the North
137 Aghion et al. Transferable ControlAmerican Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, College Park, Maryland, unpub-
lished.
Dewatripont, Mathias and Jean Tirole (1994). “A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of
Security and Manager-Shareholder Congruence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109,
1027–1054.
Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart (1986). “The Costs and Beneﬁts of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691–719.
Halonen, Maja (1997). “A Theory of Joint Ownership,” Working paper, University of Bristol.
Hart, Oliver (1995). Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford University Press.
Hart, Oliver and Bengt Holmstro ¨m (2002). “Vision and Firm Scope,” Working paper,
Harvard University and MIT.
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990). “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.” Journal
of Political Economy, 98, 1119–1158.
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1994). “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of
Human Capital.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 841–879.
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1999a). “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts.” Review of
Economic Studies, 66, 115–138.
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1999b). “On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus
Specialization,” Working paper: Harvard University and London School of Economics.
Holmstro ¨m, Bengt (1979). “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics, 10,
74–91.
Holmstro ¨m, Bengt (1982). “Moral Hazard in Teams.” Bell Journal of Economics, 13,
324–340.
Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson (1982). “Reputation and
Imperfect Information.” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253–279.
Legros, Patrick and Steven Matthews (1993). “Efﬁcient and Nearly Efﬁcient Partnerships.”
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 599–611.
Legros, Patrick and Andrew Newman (1999). “Competing for Ownership,” Working paper,
London: ECARES and University College London.
Maskin, Eric (1999). “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality.” Review of Economic
Studies, 66, 23–36.
Maskin, Eric and John Moore (1999). “Implementation and Renegotiation.” Review of
Economic Studies, 66, 39–56.
Maskin, Eric and Jean Tirole (1999). “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts.”
Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114.
Mirrlees, James (1999). “The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior, Part I.”
Review of Economic Studies, 66, 3–22.
Moore, John and Rafael Repullo (1988). “Subgame Perfect Implementation.” Econometrica,
56, 1191–1220.
Segal, Ilya (1999). “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts.”
Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57–82.
Sobel, Joel (1985). “A Theory of Credibility.” Review of Economic Studies, 52, 557–573.
Tirole, Jean (1999). “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” Econometrica, 67,
741–781.
Watson, Joel (1999). “Starting Small and Renegotiation.” Journal of Economic Theory, 85,
52–90.
138 Journal of the European Economic Association